Jump to content

ChezGiven

Donator
  • Posts

    15084
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Posts posted by ChezGiven

  1. The Guardian are noted Apple fan boys, so when the headline of their iPhone 7S review is "2014 called, it wants its phablet back", you know that this is NOT a good phone.

     

    Did you get over excited about this and not notice it was a review of the 7 Plus, not the 7S? 

     

    Best review of the 7 has to be 'doesnt blow up'. Still getting announcements on flights saying dont turn on your Samsung :lol:

  2. Sure they didn't realise how big the crash would be, 

     

     

    Just encapsulates everything everyone says about you. One of the stupidest things you've ever said and that's saying something.

     

    I see you go on to argue that everyone knew there would be a crash. 

     

    I actually was thinking about you today when discussing the distance between perception and reality and how much it is possible to shift that perception. What i didnt say was 'when you're dealing with idiots'. 

  3. The best one I've got of that list by the way is the instant hot water tap. Game changer not having to piss about waiting for the kettle to boil.

    I bought a programmable coffee machine to partly address this. This was a game change when I have to get an early flight in the morning. Coffee ready when you wake up.

  4. Finally, just got to the conclusion, the most advanced and theoretically complex models are now clearly showing that when real interest rates are at the zero bound and there are no expectations of inflation, the multiplier on government spending is much higher than predicted by Keynes. These funky new models coming our of the brightest minds at Harvard, the Federal reserve etc are at the cutting edge of probabilistic economic modeling, exactly where a thinker like Keynes would be today if he were alive. 

     

    If he was a non-conformist than standing against the orthodoxy of monetarism is where i'd bet he'd be today.

  5. He is right about the Nazis and Hitler though and what better proof of the relevance of the economic model than transforming Germany into an economic super power in a decade. 

     

    Am just getting to the depression in the UK being over by 35 (the jarrow march is in 36) and how the Americans needed the second world war to recover :lol: 

     

    Fucking hell.

  6. Ok let's bottom this once and for all with some history rather than rose tinted glasses.

     

     

    John Maynard Keynes put it best: 'Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.'

     

    He could hardly have suspected that, 70 years later, that academic scribbler would be none other than Keynes himself.

     

    For as the global economic crisis continues to unfold, the economist's ideas of borrow-and-spend government have come back into fashion with a vengeance.

     

    And yet, in the rush to embrace the new Keynesianism, we are in danger of missing the point about the old version.

     

    For Keynesianism did not, as is often imagined, put an end to the Great Depression.

     

    Indeed, the record of big-spending governments during hard times is not one to be proud of.

     

    John Maynard Keynes was, at first glance, an unlikely candidate to become one of the great icons of Left-wing politics.

     

    Born in 1883 to a Cambridge economist and social reformer, he was brought up in an atmosphere of high-minded privilege.

     

    Eton and Cambridge, where he got top marks, gave him social gloss and academic distinction.

     

    He was no scholarly drudge, though, but a lover of beauty and pleasure. (Asked on his deathbed, in 1946, whether he had any regrets, he was said to have remarked: 'I should have drunk more champagne.')

     

    By 1925, Keynes was building a reputation as the most brilliant and controversial economist in the western world.

     

    After advising the Government during World War I, he seized attention in 1919 with an attack on the Treaty of Versailles, arguing (correctly, it turned out) that its punitive terms were bound to provoke a terrible German reaction.

     

    And during the Twenties he cemented his image with a series of onslaughts on economic orthodoxy, chipping away at the three pillars of the old order - the Treaty, the gold standard (the system whereby bank notes were literally exchangeable for gold) and laissez-faire government, the economic ideology which advocates minimal state intervention.

     

    But one of the great myths about Keynes is that when the Wall Street Crash sent shockwaves through the world economy in 1929, politicians seized on his ideas as a solution to the Depression. They did nothing of the sort.

     

    For although Keynes' brains were highly regarded, he remained a heretic.

     

    His trademark notions - government borrowing and spending on public works to boost demand and alleviate recession - were unpopular on both sides of the political divide.

     

    Although Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government brought him on board in 1930, it did not take up his prescriptions.

     

    For as a Whitehall joke at the time had it, if you asked five economists for their opinions, you would get six replies - two of them from Keynes.

     

    And when a major committee asked his advice on solutions to the Depression, he gave no fewer than seven different answers.

     

    In fact, it was only at the margins of British politics than Keynesianism, as it eventually became called, really caught on.

     

    Then, the most distinguished champion of government spending in hard times was the former Liberal Prime Minister David Lloyd George, one of the most dynamic and charismatic speakers in the country.

     

    But Lloyd George was a political pariah, his image besmirched by a cash-for-peerages scandal and his private reputation damaged by a string of sexual misdemeanours.

     

    Even many Liberals hated and despised him. 'The Goat', as he was called, was far from the ideal person to sell Keynes's radical economics to the political establishment.

     

    Yet Keynes's biggest political admirer was even less salubrious. During the Twenties, he had met a dashing young Labour politician, Sir Oswald Mosley, and it was he who made the most determined effort to introduce Keynes' ideas into British economic life.

     

    As early as 1925, Mosley was arguing for nationalised banks, an economic council and centralised planning for full employment.

     

    And in 1930, Mosley, who was then a minister without portfolio outside the Cabinet, presented his famous Memorandum to the Labour Cabinet, recommending £200 million of public works and social spending to kick- start the economy into recovery.

     

    This was Keynesianism pure and simple - and the Cabinet rejected it. To most Labour ministers, borrowing money to throw at public works during tough times smacked of profligate irresponsibility.

     

    Mosley promptly flounced out of the Government and ended up founding the British Union of Fascists, horrifying his old friends and colleagues.

     

    He remained an admirer of Keynes's ideas, though - as did his great friend and mentor, Adolf Hitler.

     

    Indeed, if there was one government that did embrace Keynesianism enthusiastically in the Thirties, it was Hitler's Germany - where borrowing, spending and public works were the foundations of the Nazis' economic appeal in a country ravaged by the Depression.

     

    In Britain, meanwhile, Keynes remained a prophet crying in the wilderness.

     

    When the Labour government fell from office in 1931, ripped apart by the economic crisis and replaced with a National Government run by MacDonald and Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin, Keynes was not impressed.

     

    He thought the Tories' ideas were 'medieval' and despised Baldwin's 'stupidity'.

     

    And he was even less impressed when the first thing the National Government did was the exact opposite of what he recommended - slashing spending and ruthlessly pruning unemployment benefits to impress the markets.

     

    And yet the common image of the National Government, supposedly a cabal of rich, hard-faced men watching with callous indifference as millions of workers in flat caps trudged through the streets looking vainly for work, is complete nonsense.

     

    Indeed, the very idea of the Hungry Thirties is largely a myth. By comparison with most countries, Britain escaped the Depression relatively unscathed.

     

    Unemployment did rocket, hitting a terrifying 23 per cent in January 1933, but then it quickly fell back to pre-Crash levels.

     

    Wages remained high and, for those people still in work, life was better than ever. And as early as the end of 1933, while Germany and the U.S. were suffering the worst throes of the Depression, Britain was already in recovery.

     

    What was the key, then, to Britain's escape? It was certainly not Keynesianism - for Keynes's ideas were never tried.

     

    The key economic figure in the National Government, Chancellor Neville Chamberlain, was a strong believer in protectionist tariffs and tight money.

     

    Despite this, he was a keen reformer, setting aside cash for unemployment benefits, health and housing, but he drew the line at borrowing millions of pounds to spend on public works.

     

    And although he approved a programme of aid to depressed areas, notably the coalfields of South Wales and Tyneside shipyards, it cost a tiny £2 million - a hundred times less than the programmes Keynes and Mosley had envisaged, and nowhere near enough to make a major impact.

     

    In fact, the real key to Britain's recovery was probably the moment in September 1931 when the pound, battered by speculators, was forced off the gold standard.

     

    Until then, the Bank of England had been compelled to keep interest rates high to maintain the ludicrously elevated value of sterling.

     

    But as investors lost their faith in the pound at the height of the Depression, the Bank finally gave up the fight and abandoned the gold standard.

     

    Now there was no need for the cripplingly high interest rates and by June 1932, bank rates were down to a barely noticeable 2 per cent - the ideal level to stimulate a recovery driven by private enterprise.

     

    For while industrial areas, especially in the North, Scotland and South Wales, were suffering from the collapse of international demand in the Depression, the paradox is that many people had never had it so good.

     

    As even a socialist like George Orwell was forced to admit, when contemplating the popularity of the cinema, gambling and High Street fashion in Wigan, Britain in the Thirties was an increasingly affluent society.

     

    'It is quite likely that fish-and-chips, silk stockings, salmon, cut-price chocolate, the movies, the radio, strong tea and the Football Pools have between them averted revolution,' he grumbled.

     

    As a result, as early as 1935, the Depression in Britain was virtually over. By contrast, the U.S., where government intervention - in line with Keynesian thinking - was much more pronounced, did not begin to recover until the outbreak of World War II.

     

    While President Franklin D. Roosevelt's innumerable government schemes and unprecedented welfare spending undoubtedly protected Americans against the ravages of poverty and unemployment, they certainly did nothing to bring recovery.

     

    In many ways, the New Deal, with its obsession with government control over the economy and money supply, intervention to control prices and agricultural production among myriad social projects, was a terrible advertisement for big government.

     

    For when businesses should have been investing for the future, they were defensive and angry, their confidence shattered by Roosevelt's attacks on them.

     

    The great myth about Keynesianism, in other words, is that it was tried in the Thirties and proved successful.

     

    In fact, Keynes did not publish his landmark General Theory until 1936, and his ideas did not take hold among senior Tory and Labour politicians until the Forties.

     

    And in the years after the war his complicated theory of demand management was gradually diluted into a recipe for government spending, with prime ministers such as Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson printing money rather than facing up to the realities of Britain's industrial decline.

     

    By the mid-Seventies, the result was rampant inflation, soaring unemployment and a bloated, bureaucratic public sector, prompting Labour's Prime Minister Jim Callaghan to issue a famous repudiation of Keynesianism.

     

    'We used to think you could spend your way out of recession by boosting government spending,' he told his party in 1976.

     

    'I tell you, in all candour, that option no longer exists.'

     

    Callaghan's words marked the end for Keynesianism in Britain - which makes it all the more surprising that it is making a comeback.

     

    But while even Keynes's critics, such as the monetarist Milton Friedman, acknowledge that he was a brilliant economist, it would be a dreadful mistake to turn back the clock to the theories of the Twenties and Thirties.

     

    In fact, as a die-hard Liberal who hated socialism and supported capitalism, Keynes thought of government intervention only as a last resort.

     

    He never envisaged a public sector on the scale we have today and would be horrified by the current regime of welfare entitlements.

     

    What is more, he never anticipated the problems of soaring world commodity prices and massive inflation, which is why Keynesianism collapsed in the Seventies.

     

    His admirers insist that he would have tackled the problem of inflation had he not died in 1946 at the age of 63 - but this only hammers home the point that, at best, his theories were a work in progress, not the definitive answer to the world's ills.

     

    Above all, Keynesianism was the product of a world of national tariffs, protectionism and jealously guarded economic sovereignty.

     

    In a globalised world when governments badly need to win the confidence of international exchange markets, the idea of heedlessly borrowing and spending your way out of recession is as outdated as the films of George Formby and Gracie Fields.

     

    The crowning irony, though, is that Keynes himself would have been the first to mock his new admirers.

     

    A daring nonconformist who loved to poke fun at conventional wisdom, he would have shuddered at the thought of dusting down the orthodoxies of the past instead of thinking up solutions based on changed global realities.

     

    In other words, Keynes would have been no Keynesian. For as he rightly put it, politicians are never so ridiculous as when they make themselves 'the slaves of some defunct economist'.

     

    Word Bro ;)

     

    Thats a load of shite. Keynesian ideas arent fixed by the publication of the general theory, scholars examine the history of economic policy going back way before 1936 and award Kenyes credit for his theory fitting not only historical patterns of economic activity but its predictive power too.

     

    Then that whole loads of bollocks you've just posted falls apart because when the writer says 

     

    "But one of the great myths about Keynes is that when the Wall Street Crash sent shockwaves through the world economy in 1929, politicians seized on his ideas as a solution to the Depression. They did nothing of the sort."

     

    He is historically and factually so incorrect it makes me cringe as to think who could write it. There is economic policy thing. Called The New Deal. Its quite famous and anyone wirting that 'they did nothing of the sort' is an ill educated polemic spewing twat of the highest order. Have a read about it. Its filed under 'history of the great depression'. 

     

    Keynes doesnt get credit for the New Deal, Keynes was writing from the perspective of the writings of the Cambridge school. Economists like Joan Robinson, Alfred Marsall and Arthur Pigou had been developing the 'demand management' theories of neoclassical economics for 20 years. Their ideas are imbued into the fabric of 30s economic policy. Keynes just brought it all together into the bestseller in 36. 

  7. 120 albums? What sort of quality filter have you got on that list? Really like Ryley Walker for the one good song he puts on each of his albums, the full length listen tends to be tough to stick with. 

     

    I think i have about 15 to 20 albums from this year i could listen to all the way through. Some masterpieces but not as much depth as last year. 

     

    Anderson .paak and Chance the Rapper way out ahead (even if its not my preferred genre, no doubt the highest quality releases). 

  8. They didn't get what they wanted on June 23rd. ;)

     

    I still think we'll pull off a cracking deal.

     

    Well no you cant control the vote, which was why it was the financial market event of the year. They tried to but it didnt work. 

     

    They can control the negotiation though, or at least bring their influence to bear in a much more constructive manner. 

     

    I think we will too, cracking for the markets. Not for the voters of forgotten provincial english towns. 

  9. :lol:

     

    Pardon me for not predicting the result on June 23rd.

     

    Bottom line. You have naively discounted the most powerful people in the country getting what they want. There is a very simple and very clear trade off. Either the working class get what they want and there is the complete restriction on immigration. Or the banking and financial elite get what they want and trade is protected. None of the banking or financial outcomes of Brexit are anywhere close to happening, hence there is no need for them to exert their power just yet. 

    Who do you think takes the fall in the former case? May and her party. In this scenario, there is a political opportunity. 

  10. Bonjour :)

     

    First of all I didn't predict Cameron would romp home in 2020 given that he announced before the last general election that he wouldn't be standing in 2020.

     

     

    Cameron / Osbourne, the leaders, the party, the status quo. Whatever, you weren't predicting Cameron / Osbourne would be out of politics and you cant claim he wouldnt be standing for parliament when he clearly said he would in March of this year.

     

    https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/10/david-cameron-intends-stand-re-election-mp-in-2020

  11. CT to return to your predictive powers, you were proclaiming he Cameron / Osbourne ticket was going to romp to victory at the next election. I can't be bothered to look for quotes so let's just agree you didn't predict they would both be out of politics before the end of year. So this sweeping certainty about what's going to happen is laughable given how clueless you were over the fate over your political super stars.

     

    Now in thinking about Brexit, I am looking at the Bloomberg article his morning on the £540bn London clearing market and counting the overall value of financial services at risk in the trillions. That amount of money will win in the negotiations and when push comes to shove the powerful vested interests in this country will secure what they want and need. At this point, May starts looking like Brown, her credibility goes as she won't deliver the simplistic Brexit that the old left voters wanted. In this case (simply described as 'vested interests retain their interest') there will be a lot of people voting against May's party in the next election as the 'we were duped' line will kill the incumbent leaders. Whether this translates into anything for Labour, I would share your doubts. However, the path that May is on is beset with massive political risks and her indecisive control freak nature may undo her dramatically within the next 3 years. You (personally) have to hope that Boris etc can step in to save the day. Or there will be huge political opportunities for the opposition.

     

    That's the bottom line - given the high risk political pathway for May's government, dismissing the opposition is naive and fails to grasp the mammoth repercussions that will come from the political decisions yet to be made.

×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

We have placed cookies on your device to help make this website better. You can adjust your cookie settings, otherwise we'll assume you're okay to continue.